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The arguments contained in this Reply Brief are limited to
those issues raised on Cross-Appeal.x
1

Cross-Appellants object to Brookside's use of its reply
brief to raise additional issues. In its new Exhibit A,
Brookside omits the second page of that exhibit, (see Exhibit A
hereto, which includes the omitted second page.) The second page
of Exhibit A, together with Appendices C and E of Appellee's
Brief, demonstrate that Sam Peebles had been making monthly lot
rent payments since October, 1995 and was current in April, 1996
when the 5-day "Notice to Quit" was served. The dates and
amounts of payments as of April, 1996 are set forth on page 9,
paragraph 28 of Appellee's Brief. (See also R. 571-574.)
Brookside alleges that "Sam Peebles refused to sign a
written lease with Brookside, as required by the [Mobile Home
Park Residency Act]," and therefore he should be denied "the
benefits provided by the Act." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 10)
(citation omitted). When Sam Peebles was asked "Did you refuse
to sign a new lease," he responded: "I never was presented one.
[Jim Prentice] asked .me if I wanted to sign one. I told him I
don't see why I need to. I'm already paying rent and I'm already
under a lease ..."(R. 484, Sam Pebbles Depo. pg 36, lines 16-20.)
Brookside points to a second failed sale of the Mobile Home
by Peebles to Leroy Carlson and Tina Shayla. (Appellant's Reply
Brief, page 16.) Sam Peebles signed his second lease with the
Park after, and not before, that failed sale, (R. 570; R. 481,
page 17, lines 6-7.) Thereafter, Sam Peebles only leased the
Mobile Home.
Brookside alleges that "the Peebles failed to raise [the
waiver and estoppel] issue [s] during the summary judgment phase
of this action." (Appellant's Brief, page 12.) The issue was
specifically raised in Peebles' Amended Answer. R. 125.
Brookside "switches gears" in its Reply Brief and claims
that summary judgment was proper against Harold Peebles, Sam
Peebles father. Harold Peebles was on title to the mobile home
but never lived in the mobile home and never paid rent to the
Park. Among other things, Harold Peebles was not named on the 5day "Notice to Quit" and therefore could never be in unlawful
detainer. (See Appendice F to Appellee's Brief.) As discussed by
Judge Fratto, no case was made against Harold Peebles at trial.
(See Appellee's Brief, pp. 50-51.) No case was also made against
Harold Peebles in Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.
440-467.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the "case" against Harold Peebles to go to trial.
1

I.

THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROOKSIDE'S REFUSAL TO
MEET WITH MS. SOUTHWORTH OR TO ALLOW HER TO SUBMIT AN
APPLICATION FOR RESIDENCY WAS NOT UNREASONABLE.

Brookside ignores the central issue to Sam Peebles' claim
that it was unreasonable for Brookside to refuse to meet with
Jackie Southworth or to allow her to fill out an application for
residency.

In its Reply Brief, Brookside claims that Sam Peebles

has failed to "marshal the evidence" on this issue.

However,

Brookside does not dispute that Jim Prentice, the Brookside
mobile home park manager, refused to meet with or accept an
application for residency from Jackie Southworth.

That is all

the evidence Peebles needs to "marshal" to prevail on this claim.
Ms. Southworth made an appointment to meet with Jim
Prentice, to fill out an application for residency and to review
her financial information with Mr. Prentice.

When she arrived,

Jim Prentice testified that he "told her she had been denied by
the owner" and he sent her away.

(T. at 616, lines 18-19.)

A

mobile home park must at least meet with a prospective resident
and provide them the opportunity to apply for residency.

This

was denied Ms. Southworth.
Brookside cites testimony by Clair Patrick, Ms. Southworth's
real estate agent, acknowledging that Ms. Southworth would have
to have a credit check.

(Appellant's Reply Brief at page 30.)

2

That is not the issue.

The issue is that after Ms. Southworth

had a credit check Brookside refused to meet with Jackie
Southworth to discuss the financial issues that the credit check
could not verify.
Brookside claims that Jim Prentice's testimony regarding his
inability to yell "impeached" Jackie Southworth's testimony.
(Appellant's Brief at 3 0.) Whether Jim Prentice "yelled" at
Jackie Southworth is not the issue.

Jim Prentice did not dispute

that he refused to meet with Ms. Southworth and refused to allow
her to fill out an application for residency.

(R. 616.)

Brookside cites "to portions of the trial transcript wherein
Ms. Southworth acknowledges that Western Reporting was unable to
verify her employment or her account with Utah First Credit.2
One purpose of Ms. Southworth's appointment with Jim Prentice was
to verify her employment to Mr. Prentice and to provide him with
information on her account with Utah First Credit.
Prentice refused to meet with her.
been "denied by the owner."

However, Jim

He told her she had already

(T. at 616, lines 18-19.) Ms.

2

"In the testimony of Ms. Southworth, she acknowledged that
her credit report from Western Reporting states that Western
Reporting was unable "to verify her employment though the
employment was at a company she owned." (Appellant's Reply Brief
at 18) (citation omitted). "Ms. Southworth also acknowledged
that her credit report from Western Reporting indicate [sic] that
Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah First
Credit." Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
3

Southworth testified that "I would not allow any of my banks, or
person[nel] to verify anything to anyone without [the] okay from
me."

(T. at 3 07, lines 23-24.)

Therefore, she was prepared to

"verify [her income] by tax returns at any time."

(T. at 308,

lines 4-5.)

However, Brookside refused to meet with Ms.

Southworth.

Brookside did not give Ms. Southworth the

opportunity to "verify" her income or otherwise provide credit
information to Brookside.
Brookside cites to testimony by Jim Prentice that he did not
see tax returns or other financial information with Ms.
Southworth when she came to his office.
Brief, page 32.)

(Appellant's Reply

However, Jim Prentice does not deny that Ms.

Southworth came to his office and he refused to meet with her.
What Ms. Southworth may have had in her hand and what Mr.
Prentice saw (or didn't see) in her hand is irrelevant.

Jim

Prentice didn't meet with her to find out what she was willing to
provide to him.
Brookside argues that "[t]he Peebles did not tender Ms.
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut Brookside's basis
for denying her application and so the issue has not been
preserved on appeal."

(Appellant's Reply Brief at 32.) Alan

Glover, the owner of the Park, testified that he had rejected Ms.
Southworth because Western Credit had been "unable to verify
4

employment."

(T. at 70.)

Accordingly, the "basis" for Brookside

rejecting Ms. Southworth had nothing to do with Ms. Southworth's
tax returns.

Brookside rejected Ms. Southworth because Western

Credit had been "unable to verify employment."

Ms. Southworth7s

tax returns had nothing to do with the reason Ms. Southworth was
rejected as a prospective resident of the Park and were not
required to be introduced into evidence.

Estate of Morrison v.

West One Trust Co., 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the case
on which Brookside relies is inapposite.3
Brookside states that "Ms. Southworth's credit report
indicating that the credit agency was unable to verify her
employment or bank account is sufficient evidence to support the
judge's verdict that Brookside's rejection of her application as
a tenant to be reasonable."

(Appellant's Reply Brief, page 33.)

This is simply not true. As a matter of law, a mobile home park
cannot reject a prospective tenant based on an incomplete credit
report without giving the prospective tenant an opportunity to
explain why the credit report was incomplete.
3

Brookside refused

In the Estate of Morrison, the Court held that a may not
"introduce" an "entirely new argument on appeal." (Estate of
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah [Ct. ] App. 1997)). In this
case, the basis for denying Ms. Southworth the opportunity to
apply for residency or meet with the Park Manager was Western
Credits inability to'"verify employment." (T. at 70.)
Introducing Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence had
nothing to do with preserving for appeal the issue of whether
Brooksides' behavior was "unreasonable."
5

to give Ms. Southworth the opportunity to do so and refuse to
accept an application from her.

Ms. Southworth stood ready and

willing to provide her tax returns and other financial
information to Brookside.

Brookside never gave her that

opportunity.
Brookside states that it ''rejected [Ms. Southworth's]
application based on her financial inadequacies as documented in
her credit report."

(Appellant's Reply Brief, pg 35.)

The only

"financial inadequacies" in Ms. Southworth's credit report were
Western Reports comments that it was "unable to verify" Ms.
Southworth's employment and that Ms. Southworth's bank "would not
verify information over the phone."

(T. 69, lines 17-22.)

When

Ms. Southworth tried to provide this information to Brookside,
the Park Manager refused to meet with her.

That is unreasonable.

The Mobile Home Park Residency Act provides that "approval"
of a prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become
a resident of the park may not be "unreasonably withheld."

For

Brookside to refuse to even meet with or accept an application
from a prospective purchaser is per se "unreasonable."
Brookside's actions in this case are contrary to the overall
purpose of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, which states:
The fundamental right to own and protect
land and to establish conditions for its
use by others necessitate[s] that the
owner of a mobile home park be provided
6

with speedy and adequate remedies
against those who abuse the terms of a
tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile
homes,- the requirement of mobile home
parks relating to their installation,
and the cost of landscaping and lot
preparation necessitate that the owners
of mobile homes occupied within mobile
home parks be provided with protection
from actual or constructive eviction.
It is the purpose of this chapter to
provide protection for both the owners
of mobile homes located in mobile home
parks and . . . the owners of mobile
home parks.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1994) (emphasis added.); see also
Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, fl9, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(recognizing that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act serves the
twofold purpose of protecting park residents and park owners).
The Act specifically recognizes "the high cost of moving mobile
homes."

In this case, Brookside rejected Ms. Southworth, the

third prospective purchaser that Sam Peebles brought to the Park.
As a result, Sam Peebles lost a sale of his mobile home for
$25,000 in September, 1996.

(See Appellees' Brief at 10-13.)

Sam Peebles continued to pay lot rent, even though the Mobile
Home was vacant and Brookside had rejected three prospective
purchasers, including Jackie Southworth.
Finally, in November, 1997, over one year after Ms.
Southworth's rejection, the Mobile Home was finally sold and
moved to Evanston, Wyoming at a net profit of $1,422.50.
7

(Appellees' Brief at 13, paragraph 48) (citation omitted). 4

This

excludes the additional $3,177.00 in lot rent Sam Pebbles had to
pay from October 25, 1996 through November 20, 1997.5
The prohibition against ''unreasonably withholding" approval
for applications for residency by prospective purchasers, which
is set forth in section 57-16-4(4), was designed to protect
mobile home owners from the "high cost" of arbitrary and
capricious refusals by mobile home park owners.
Brookside so little to be reasonable.
great deal.

It cost

It cost Sam Peebles a

Instead of selling his home for $25,000 in October,

1996, he had to move it to Evanston, Wyoming and sold it for a
net profit of $1,422.50 in November, 1997, plus he had to
continue to pay lot rent on space #100 from October, 1996 through
November, 1997.
The Court of Appeals errored in failing to reverse to jury
verdict as to Jackie Southworth.

In refusing to overturn the

jury verdict, the Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

4

CiL. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)
(stating that xx[t]he term 'mobile home' is somewhat misleading.
Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because
the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the
value of the mobile home itself.").
5

October 25, 1996 was the closing date under the Real
Estate Purchase Contract between Peebles and Jackie Southworth
(Trial Exhibit D-67.) November 20, 1997 was the day the Mobile
Home was finally moved from the Park.
8

Here, the jury heard evidence that Brookside
was unable to verify Southworth's employment
and bank account. It also heard evidence
that the mobile home remained in disrepair
at that time. Although Southworth testified
with explanations as to why she should not
have been penalized for these circumstances,
the jury was free to disbelieve her and to
believe Brookside's witnesses to the contrary.
We therefore conclude that sufficient
evidence supported the jury's factual
determination on the reasonableness of
Brookside's behavior and affirm the jury's
verdict.
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Sam Peebles et. al.

2000

Utah Ct. App. 314, paragraph 38, 14 P.3d 105 (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that Ms. Southwick
was able to provide her "explanations" to Brookside.
occurred.

This never

The issue is whether it was "unreasonable" for

Brookside to refuse Ms. Southwick the opportunity to provide
those explanations.

Brookside refused to meet with Ms. Southwick

and refused to allow her to fill out an application for
residency.

Brookside's refusal to meet with or accept an

application for residency from Ms. Southworth was a "per se"
"unreasonable withholding" of approval of residency under the
Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
As to the condition of the Mobile Home, Brookside correctly
states that this is "not an issue on appeal." (Appellant's Reply
Brief, page 35.)

As previously discussed, Jim Prentice refused

to meet with Ms. Southworth.

(T. at 301, line 12-25.)

Jim

Prentice also refused to allow her to discuss the improvements
9

she was going to make to the trailer.

(T. at 313, lines 4-18.)

Ms. Southworth testified that she was planning on putting an
additional $4,000.00 in improvements into the Mobile Home:
I had a subcontractor come out with me and
look at it, and in fact he listed the price
of what everything would cost me. [T]he cost
of repairs was about $4,000.00 that I was
going to put into that trailer.
(T. at 309, lines 10-15.)
Ms. Southworth compiled a list of improvements that she was going
to make, and she wanted to discuss those with Jim Prentice, the
Park manager.

(T. at 312, line 20-22.

Again, Ms. Southworth was

denied the opportunity to meet with Brookside to explain her plan
to invest an additional $4,000.00 in upgrading the Mobile Home.
Jim Prentice would not meet with Ms. Southworth.
not allow her to fill out an application for residency.

He would
He would

not allow her to discuss the improvements she was going to make
to the Mobile Home.

He would not allow her to comment on the

Western Credit report.

He would not allow her to discuss her

financial affairs with him.

Brookside alleges that it "extended

every effort to amicably resolve its dispute with the Peebles."
(Appellant's Reply Brief, page 37.)

This is absolutely false.

The facts in this case speak for themself.
If Brookside's behavior in this case was not "unreasonable,"
then Section 57-16-4(4) is a dead letter.

For the benefit and

protection of mobile home owners, this Court must require that

10

mobile home park agents at least meet with prospective applicants
and at least allow them to fill out an application for residency.
The refusal to do so -is an "unreasonable withholding" of approval
for residency in violation of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah
Code.

The Court of Appeals errored in not reversing the jury

verdict on this issue.
CONCLUSION
This Court should uphold the

Court of Appeals decision that

the trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in granting
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, did not err in granting
defendants' motion for directed verdict, and did not err in
denying plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees.
This Court should find that the issue of whether Brookside
preserved the "bona fide" purchaser an appeal is moot since the
Court of Appeals addressed that issue substantially later in its
opinion, the Court should also find that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that Brookside did not comply with Rule 24(a)(8)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure with respect to Harold
Peebles.
This Court should find that the Court of Appeals errored in
not overturning the jury verdict.

This Court should find that

Brookside's refusal to meet with or to allow Ms. Southworth to
fill out an application for residency is a per

se violation of

section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code, which provides that approval

11

of a prospective purchaser for residency may not be "unreasonably
withheld."
This Court should uphold the Court of Appeal's decision to
reverse the trial court's denial of defendants' Motion for
Attorney's Fees and the Court of Appeals decision to award
defendants' their attorneys fees for defending the eviction
action on appeal.

Peebles should also be awarded attorney's fees

for successfully defending the eviction action on appeal before
this Court and before the Court of Appeals, and this Court should
remand this case for a determination consistent therewith.
DATED this

[P

day of December, 2001.
CRIPPEN St C L I N E ,

/

L.C.

7

R t t s s e l l X. C l i n e
Attorney for Appellees
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellees have been mailed postage prepaid on this I3> day "of December, 2001 to the following:
Dennis K. Poole
John L. Adams
Poole, Sullivan & Adams, L.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDICE A
(December 4, 1996 letter, with attachment.)

DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C.
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY

December 4, 1996

4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 94107
TELEPHONE (801) 263-0344
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010

Mr. Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Sam Peebles

Dear Mr. Cline:
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the
rights of the parties.
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1,
1996 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent.
After
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
\ VeryN^uly yours,

DENNIS K. POOLE
DKP:ec
Enc.
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks
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